Ignore the downer replying to you. If you found something that works well for you, then great!
... Alpine is designed to be friendly to corporations who want to lock down their devices and prevent you from modifying them.
"Designed to" assumes intent. Alpine is absolutely designed to be Small, Simple, and Secure. Using busybox instead of the GNU coreutils is a means to this end. Using musl instead of glibc is a means to this end.
On the about page they list why they use these tools. The licensing is not listed at all.
I have probably already left (consciously or not) enough info on the internet, for data scrapers/AI tools/whatever to probably know me better than myself, and that's probably true for any person that have ever used internet.
Knowing you? Possibly. The second half of your claim is unsubstantiated.
Websites might know specific aspects of how you use the internet, for example, what times you use that site. This is just information you yourself haven't cared enough to log and examine. It isn't extraordinary.
To extrapolate that to "Better than I know myself" is paranoia.
A threat model in which you don't trust the Linux Foundation and volunteers but do trust Microsoft.
Its all about what you want to protect. If a security breach is worse for you on Linux than it is on Windows because of which party has the data, then for you, Windows might be more secure.
Some people get confused because they think there is some objective measurable security rating one can apply to a system for every person. There isn't. We may use the same systems but have different threat models and thus rate the security different.
Privilege escalations always have to be granted by an upper-privilege process to a lower-privilege process.
There is one general way this happens.
Ex: root opens up a line of communication between it and a user, the user sends input to root, root mishandles it, it causes undesired behavior within the root process and can lead to bad things happening.
All privilege escalation is two different privilege levels having some form of interaction. Crossing the security boundary. If you wish to limit this, you need to find the parts of the system that cross that boundary, like sudo[1], and remove those from your system.
[1]: sudo is an SUID binary. That means, when you run it, it runs as root. This is a problem, because you as a process have some influence on code that executes within the program (code running as root).
secureblue is about as secure as Linux can get...
Unless you have an unusual threat model, this statement is utter nonsense. I can run a kconfig stripped kernel with zero kernel modules and one userspace process that is completely audited and trusted, without the ability to spawn even other processes or talk to network (because the kernel lacks support for the IP stack).
Secureblue might offer something significant when compared to other popular and easily usable tools, but if you compare it to the theoretical limit of Linux security, its not even comparable.
I examined Secureblue's kernel parameters and turned multiple of them off because some were mitigations for something that was unnecessary. IE: The kernel would make the analysis that your hardware is not affected by a vulnerability, and thus there is no need to enable a specific mitigation. But they would override this and force the mitigation, so you take a performance hit, for what I understand to be, no security gain. Not sure why they did that, a mistake? Or did they simply not trust the kernel's analysis for some reason? Who knows.
Is desktop linux more insecure than Windows?
This is an impossible question to answer without more information. Depends on your threat model, how you use the computer, your distro, etc.
If they don't have the training data available, then I wouldn't consider them open source.
...if someone nefarious gets to the point they can read this stuff then they’ll already be able to record your screen, log keystrokes, etc.
No screenshots -> less data. Less data -> lower breach severity.
(Unless you have an unusual threat model)
All this can be gutted by an advanced user.
It literally would have been easier to make an account than to type up this comment.
Not necessarily. Avoid making assumptions about those whose threat model and precautions you know little about.
The difference would be that RMS is extremely well-versed in computer technology. He understands the problems with non-free software.
Someone with his knowledge could choose to disregard those issues for convenience, but Stallman is willing to make great sacrifices.
...the government is absolutely a threat to you.
I don't see how this supports your previous claim of: "If you don’t have privacy from the government, you don’t have privacy."
If you don’t have privacy from the government, you don’t have privacy.
Privacy refers to more than just privacy regarding the government.
Your threat model and situation might mean that if the government knows something, its as bad as if every single person knows it.
But this isn't for everyone.
But now it's too long for a power user.
Short and Long options are a thing.
Ex: GNU rm can use
undefined
--recursive
undefined
-r
or
undefined
--force
undefined
-f
To be fair, that is an issue with the implementation of the given commands, rather than the concept of the command line.
You could create a program that operates like so:
undefined
remove-file --dont-ask-for-confirmation house.png
Linux is software.
It doesn't contain this intrinsic meaning you refer to.
It's self-explanatory to you because you're already familiar with the logic, language, conventions. I'm guessing, you grew up with all that from childhood...
This argument can be used as a reason to implement GUIs.
If we wish to market to an audience that has had some basic experience with using Windows and Mac, we can skip some of the reteaching by implementing familiar GUIs
Lemmy is a piece of software. Who "cares" or doesn't is dependant on the people administrating instances you use or communicate with.
Decentralization. Don't think there's a place for your speech? Run your own server.

Infuriating Indentation Heuristic
Helix is great, but please why can't indentation just be what is set in the language.toml file?
undefined
[[language]] name = "zig" indent = { tab-width = 8, unit = "\t" }
Changing indent-heuristic doesn't fix it. Why does helix give me the option to set the indentation style and then proceed to overwrite it, Instantly resetting it to 4 spaces instead of what I told it.
The behavior that is occurring is extremely weird and would be instantaneously solved if helix would just use the value in the file.
I don't want your garbage heuristic, I just want you to leave my file alone and do what I told you.