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2 yr. ago
  • It's used to check for website breaches. From How to stop Firefox from making automatic connections:

    Firefox Monitor warns you if your online accounts were involved in a known data breach. For more information, see Firefox Password Manager - Alerts for breached websites.

    To get the latest login breach information and more, Firefox connects to firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com

    To disable, see here.

  • The attack worked, the password is cmF0dGEK.

    This was obtained by generating 32 possible plaintexts for the first 10 bytes of system.zip (based on the different values in the headers of ~300 zip files on my system), plus three null bytes for the high bytes of compressed size, file name length and extra field length.

  • The inner zip files are just stored, uncompressed:

     text
        
    Archive: update.zip
    Index Encryption Compression CRC32    Uncompressed  Packed size Name
    ----- ---------- ----------- -------- ------------ ------------ ----------------
        0 ZipCrypto  Store       d1bca061     65761967     65761979 system_lib.zip
        1 ZipCrypto  Deflate     64a3f383         2183          741 config.json
        2 ZipCrypto  Store       3731280f     89300292     89300304 app.zip
        3 ZipCrypto  Store       a2bd64f5    135518964    135518976 app_lib.zip
        4 ZipCrypto  Store       700eb186      5996410      5996422 system.zip
    
      

    So 12 bytes from the original content.

  • The entries in update.zip are encrypted using the weak ZipCrypto scheme, which is known to be seriously flawed. If you feel motivated, and can guess at least 12 bytes of plaintext for an entry, it is possible to recover the internal state of the generator, which is enough to decipher the data entirely, as well as other entries which were encrypted with the same password. The bkcrack project implements this attack.

    Since some of the entries are zip files themselves, it is within the realm of possibility to guess 12 bytes of plaintext. Parts of the zip local file header are pretty static, and you can use some of the values from the local file header of update.zip itself. Still, this would require a bit of luck / inspired guesswork.

  • Options:

    • Just start it from the terminal with torsocks
    • Use application-specific proxy settings
    • Since torsocks simply uses LD_PRELOAD, you could try to make this apply globally by adding the torsocks library to ld.so.preload. Just put the path returned by torsocks show in /etc/ld.so.preload.
  •  rust
        
    fn foo(x: i32) {
        match x {
            const { 3.pow(3) } => println!("three cubed"),
            _ => {}
        }
    }
    
      

    But it looks like inline_const_pat is still unstable, only inline_const in expression position is now stabilized.

  • https://linux-tc-notes.sourceforge.net/tc/doc/cls_u32.txt:

    The base operation of the u32 filter is actually very simple. It extracts a bit field from a 32 bit word in the packet, and if it is equal to a value supplied by you it has a match. The 32 bit word must lie at a 32 bit boundary.

  • I think glider can do this, with -strategy rr (Round Robin mode). I have not used it in this way myself, so you might need to experiment a little. Proxychains can also do this, but it doesn't present a socks5 interface itself (it uses LD_PRELOAD, so it won't work everywhere).

  • AnarchyChess @sopuli.xyz
    0v0 @sopuli.xyz

    Sicilian Defense: Hyperaccelerated Dragon, Fianchetto, Pterodactyl Defense

    This is a favourite of mine. White to move. rnbqk1nr/pp1pppbp/6p1/2pt5/3PP3/5N2/PPP2PPP/RNBQKB1R w KQkq - 1 4

    (Original posted to [email protected])