Search

Why Ukraine may be choosing a war of attrition
t is now two months since Ukraine launched its counter-offensive against Russian lines that stretch across 1,000km of occupied territory. It is just over a week since the campaign appeared to be entering a distinct second phase.
The first phase got off to a bad start when an overambitious thrust by newly formed mechanised units swiftly became bogged down. It was subsequently marked by concerted attempts to use Ukraine’s advantage in long-range firepower to disrupt Russian supply lines and destroy its logistical hubs and command centres. The aim is to reduce the ability of Russian forces to respond to Ukraine’s “probing” operations, which are seeking out gaps and weaknesses. (The tactics are similar to the “bite and hold” approach used by both sides in the first world war.) These operations have recently been supplemented by small-scale drone strikes on Moscow and a series of attacks by Ukraine’s developing fleet of naval drones on Russian patrol vessels in the Black Sea. The Moscow dr