Sietske A.L. van Till and Eline M. Bunnik (2024) have recently expressed a concern about science miscommunication regarding human brain organoids. They worry that the mereological fallacy is often being committed when the possibility of brain organoid psychological capacities such as consciousness and intelligence are considered, especially by bioethicists discussing the moral status of human brain organoids. Focusing specifically on one psychological capacity, namely consciousness, this article begins with a brief introduction to van Till and Bunnik’s concern about the mereological fallacy as it relates to brain organoids. It is then shown that whether the mereological fallacy is being committed depends on commitments in philosophy of mind about how consciousness relates to the brain and its neural mechanisms. This is demonstrated by appealing to two different example views about the ontology of consciousness embraced by J.J.C. Smart’s type identity theory and a version of hylomorphi

Belgian municipalities have started forcing people to use web browsers to interact with public services. That’s right. It’s no longer possible to reach a variety of public services in an analog way in some Belgian regions. And for people willing to wrestle with the information systems being imposed, it also means cash payment is now impossible when a service requires a fee. The government is steam-rolling over elderly people who struggle with how to use technology along with those who only embrace inclusive privacy-respecting technology. These groups are apparently small enough to be marginalized without government reps worrying about lost votes.

Hypothetically, what would happen if some Amish villages existed in Belgium? I ask because what’s being imposed would strongly go against their religion. Would the right to practice religion carry enough weight to compel the government to maintain an offline option even if it’s a small group of Amish? If yes, would that option likely be